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COMMENTS
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-WHAT CONSTITUTES
EXTORTION IN COLLECTION LETTERS
The problem of collection letters and the possibility of incurring
criminal liability under extortion statutes, is not what one might term a
new problem to the majority of attorneys. A recent California case1
gives us some indication of the nature of the issues involved.
Libarian, an attorney, after having lost a case involving a wage dis-
pute, wrote to his client's employer stating in effect that the employer
had perjured himself on the witness stand. However, were the em-
ployer to pay the disputed wages and the court costs involved in the
recent trial, his perjury would go unpunished. On the basis of this
letter Libarian was found guilty of having violated his oath and duties
as an attorney of law, and of having perpetrated an act of moral turpi-
tude and dishonesty within the meaning of the applicable sections of
the Business and Professions Code. He was subsequently suspended
from the practice of law for six months.
Though basically dealing with extortion as a ground for disbarment,
the Libarian case likewise suggests the following question: To what
extent may one refer to criminal liability or threaten criminal prosecu-
tion in attempting to collect a debt or prosecute a claim before subject-
ing oneself to criminal liability under Wis. STATS. (1951), sec. 340.45?
ANALYSIS OF THE OFFENSE
Most states have covered the problem of threatening letters by
statutes, Wisconsin doing so in Wis. STATS. (1951), sec. 340.45.2 The
statute itself sets up but two elements as comprising the offense: (1) a
malicious threat to accuse or do injury; (2) intent to (a) extort money
or any pecuniary advantage, or, (b) compel a person to do or omit an
act against his will.
The Wisconsin court in State v. Schsdtz,3 makes it clear that the
threat to accuse or to do injury is in and of itself, the basis of the of-
' Librarian v. State Bar, 239 P. 2d 865 (Cal. 1952).
2 WIs. STATS. (1951), sec. 340.45, "Threats to accuse of crime or injure. Any
person who shall, either verbally or by any written or printed communication,
maliciously threaten to accuse another of any crime or offense, or to do any
injury to the person, property, business, profession, calling or trade of another,
with intent thereby to extort money or any pecuniary advantage, whatever, or
with intent to compel the person so threatened to do any act against his will
or omit to do any lawful act, shall be punished by imprisonment in the stdte
prison not more than two years nor less than one year or by fine not exceed-
ing five hundred dollars or less than one hundred dollars."
3 "We think that the gist of the offense under the statute is the threat to accuse
another of any crime or offense or to threaten to do an injury to the person,
property, business, profession, calling or trade with the intent to extort money
or pecuniary advantage or compel the person so threatened to do an act
against his will or omit to do a lawful act, being a mere incident to the threat
and dependent upon it, and where there is no such threat as contemplated by
the statutes alleged or proved, no offense under the statute is established."
State v. Schultz, 153 Wis. 644, 114 N.W. 505 (1908).
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fense. However, the same court in O'Neil v. State,4 although not mak-
ing mention of the Schultz case makes it quite clear that while a threat
meets the formal requirements of the statute, a malicious intent to do
one of the acts as outlined in the statute must be conclusively proved.
The subsequent emphasis in later cases, e.g., Stockman v. State,' on the
matter of proof of malicious intent behind a threat, would seem to give
us some indication of the relative importance of the two elements.
ADDITIONAL FACTORS
In connection with these two basic requirements, some courts have
given added importance to several factors usually attendant upon any
extortion case. Wisconsin, in most cases, disregards them as irrelevant
and immaterial. Perhaps the most significant of these is whether one
can be convicted of extortion while engaged in an honest attempt to
collect a debt due or'believed due. On this point states are "hopelessly
divided"'6 and individual statutes must be consulted in each particular
state.
Some indication as to the rule in Wisconsin has been given in O'Neil
vz. State.7 The Wisconsin court, citing a Massachusetts case," decided
under a statute9 similar to Wisconsin's, 0 remarks:
"The first instruction asked, that the defendant must have ma-
4". . . it also follows that the court did not err in denying defendant's request
to instruct tthe jury that 'the defendants had a right to demand money of
Mrs. Lehman in settlement of their claim, and to tell her if she did not pay
damages they would institute criminal proceeding against her.' To render that
correct and applicable as an instruction, it should have been stated that de-
fendants had such right if in making their demand and threat they were not
acting so maliciously with intent to thereby extort money." O'Neil v. State,
237 Wis. 391, 296 N.W. 96, 135 A.L.R. 719 (1940).
5 "The question was whether Mrs. Klemp sought to settle the claim for civil
damages which she in good faith suposed she had against Wolfe or whether
she extorted money under threat of criminal prosecution." Stockman v. State,
236 Wis. 27, 293 N.W. 923 (1940). cf. People v. Thompson, 27 N.Y. 313 (1884);
State v. Bruce, 24 Maine 71 (1844).
6 See Note, 135 A.L.R. 719 (1940).
7 Supra, note 4.
8 Commonwealth v. Coolidge, 128 Mass. 55 (1880) ; cf. People v. Beggs, 178 Cal.
79, 172 P. 152 (1918). "It is the means employed which the law denounces,
and though the purpose may be to collect a just indebtedness arising from and
created by the criminal act for which the threat is to prosecute the wrongdoer,
it is nevertheless within the statutory inhibition. The law does not contemplate
the use of criminal process as a means of collecting a debt. To invoke such
process for the purpose named is, as held by all authorities, contrary to public
policy."
9 GEN. STATS. MASS. (1860), Chap. 160, Sec. 28. "Whoever, either verbally or by
a written or printed communication, maliciously threatens to accuse another
of any crime or offense, or by such communication maliciously threatens an
injury to the person or property of another, with intent thereby to extort
money or any pecuniary advantage whatever, or with intent to compel the per-
son so threatened to do any act against his will, shall be punished by imprison-
ment in the state prison not exceeding fifteen years, or in the house of cor-
rection not exceeding ten years, or by fine not exceeding five thousand dollars,
or by such imprisonment and fine."
10 Supra, note 2.
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liciously intended to obtain that which in justice and equity he
knew he had no right to receive, and the other, which differs only
in form from that, that the defendant was not guilty if he be-
lieved that Chaplin actually' owed him, could not propertly have
been given without qualification; and the language of the presid-
ing judge was entirely accurate when he said that the law did
not authorize the collection of just debts by the malicious threat-
ening to accuse the debtor of a crime."
Thus it would seem that the mere fact that the debt was due and that
the person was making a sincere attempt to collect it, would not in and
of itself be sufficient to warrant approval of the method employed.
However, the question of the intent behind the threat and the demand
would, as we shall see, play a great part in deciding the issue before
the Wisconsin courts.
Another factor considered by some states is whether or not the
money demanded is actually obtained. Such is not the requirement in
Wisconsin. The court in O'Neil v. State," commenting on cases2
which have arisen under "threat" statutes13 similar to Wisconsin's, 4
remarks:
"... and as there is nothing in these provisions which can be
deemed to make the actual obtaining of money an essential ele-
ment of the crime, the decisions under statutes requiring that as
an essential element are not in point."
The issue of the accused's guilt or innocence is another factor con-
sidered by some courts. While proof of the accused's guilt as to the
crime with which he is charged may be material in determining the
intent of the extortionist,' 5 his actual guilt is immaterial and will not
constitute a defense to the charge of extortion. Such is the opinion of
1 "Supra, note 4.
1 Commonwealth v. Corcoran, 252 Mass. 465, 148 N.E. 123 (1925); People v.
Thompson, supra, note 5.
13 MAss. GEN. LAws (1921), Chap. 265, Sec. 25. "Whoever, either verbally or by
a written or printed communication, maliciously threatens to accuse another of
any crime or offense, or by such communication maliciously threatens an in-jury to the person or property of another, with intent thereby to extort money
or any pecuniary advantage, or with intent to compel the person so threatened
to do any act against his will shall be punished by imprisonment in the state
prison for not more than fifteen years, or in the house of correction for not
more than two and one half years, or by a fine of not more than five hundred
dollars, or both."
N. Y. REv. STATs. (1881), Part IV, Chap. I, art. 6, sec. 2. "Every person who
shall either verbally or by written or printed communication threaten to com-
municate or to publish in any manner or to use information or documents or
statements that are alleged to be injurious to the person's reputation or to the
business standing of any other person, with intent by any such threatening to
extort any property or to derive any pecuniary or valuable benefit whatever
to the person making such threat, or to any other person or persons shall, upon
conviction be adjudged guilty of a misdemeanor and punished as here-in-after
described."
14 Supra, note 2.
I5 Mann v. State, 47 Ohio St. 556, 26 N.E. 226 (1890) ; cf. Elliot v. State, 36 Ohio
St. 318 (1881).
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the New York court in deciding a case' under a "threat" statute 7
similar to Wisconsin's :18
"The fact that the person who in writing or orally makes such a
threat for such a purpose believes, or even knowing that the per-
son threatened has committed the crime of which he is threatened
to be accused does not make the act less criminal. The moral
turpitude of threatening for the purpose of obtaining money, to
accuse a guilty person of a crime which he has committed is as
great as it is to threaten for a like purpose, an innocent person
of having committed a crime. The intent is the same in both
cases-to acquire money without legal right, by threatening a
legal prosecution. The fact that the defendant believes in the
complainant's guilt is no defense and is not even a mitigating
fact."
To a certain extent, some courts consider the manner in which the
threat is made, i.e., written, printed, or oral, in determining the severity
and extent of criminal liability. New York is typical of that group of
states. "' Wisconsin, on the other hand, by the very wording of its
statute"0 excludes any differentiation or distinction either as to the
nature of the crime or the degree of criminal liability attendant thereto.
Several possibiilties that may arise under Wis. STATS. (1951), sec.
340.45, are illustrated by the following cases:
DEMAND COUPLED WITH AN EXPRESS THREAT
In Stockman v. State,"1 Wolfe sold beer to a Mrs. Klemp's minor
daughter. The evidence in the case indicated that as a price for her
silence Mrs. Klemp expressly demanded $100.00 and the cancellation
16 People v. Eichler, 75 Hun. 26, 26 N.Y. Supp. 998 (1894).
17 N. Y. REv. STATS. supra, note 13.
28 Supra, note 2.
19 CONSOLIDATED LAWS OF N. Y. ANNO. (1951), Penal Law Sec. 856. "A person
who, knowing the contents thereof and with intent, by means thereof, to extort
or gain any money or other property or to do, abet or procure any illegal or
wrongful act, sends, delivers or in any manner causes to be forwarded or
received, or makes and parts with for the purpose that these may be sent or
delivered, any letter or writing threatening,
1. To accuse any person of a crime; or
2. To do any injury to any person or to any property; or
3. To publish or connive at publishing any libel; or
4. To expose or impute to any person any deformity or disgrace,
Is punishable by imprisonment for not more than fifteen years." (As amended
L. 1909, C. 368, eff. Sept. 1, 1909; derived, Penal Code Sec. 558, L. 1881, C. 676.)
Penal Law Sec. 857 Attempt to extort money or property by oral threats.
"A person who, under circumstances not amounting to robbery or an attempt
at robbery, with intent to extort or gain any money or other property, orally
makes such a threat as would be criminal under any of the fore-going sections
of this article or of article five-hundred and forty-one if made or communi-
cated in writing, is guilty of a misdemeanor. The provisions of this section
do not aply to matters given by section eight-hundred and fifty-one of this
article." (As amended L. 1911, C. 121, eff. Sept. 1, 1911; derived, Penal Code
Sec. 560, L. 1881, C. 676.)
20 Supra, note 2.
21 Stockman v. State, supra, note 5.
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of a liquor bill amounting to $11.94. As a defense to the charge of
extortion, Mrs. Klemp pleaded that she merely attempted settlement
of a disputed bill and took the $40.00 agreed upon as satisfaction for
civil damages arising out of sale of beer to her minor daughter. Thus,
the question is posed as to whether a demand for a sum of money
coupled with an express threat of criminal prosecution is, in and of
itself, sufficient to constitute an offense under Wisconsin's "threat"
statute.2  The decision in this case would indicate that it is not. Though
found quilty, the question of the intent behind Mrs. Klemp's act was
the deciding factor in the case. As the court said:
"The question was whether Mrs. Klemp sought to settle a claim
for civil damages which she in good faith supposed she had
against Wolfe or whether she extorted money under threat of
criminal prosecution."
As previously pointed out, the same importance is placed upon the in-
tent factor in the case of O'Neil v. State.23 On the other hand, earlier
in the opinion the court, in citing People v. Beggs,24 placed a great deal
of emphasis on the form of the threat and means employed-"It is the
means employed which the law denounces . . ." However, the court's
subsequent emphasis on the question of intent would lead us to believe
that it, rather than the form and means employed, is the deciding factor
in an extortion prosecution.
DEMAND PLus THREAT REFERRING TO BASIS OF DEMAND
In People v. Beggs,2 5 the California court in sustaining a conviction
for extortion, considered the problem of a demand for a sum of money
accompanied by threatened criminal procedure based on the very act
establishing the debt for which satisfaction is demanded. One Da Rosa
had stolen goods from one Steining, the value of which was estimated
at $50.00. Beggs, an attorney, in writing to Da Rosa, demanded $2,-
000.00 as settlement and threatened him with imprisonment if it were
not paid. In sustaining a conviction for extortion, the court approved
an instruction that the following was the duty of the jury:
".. . to convict the defendant, even though he should also find
that he believed that Da Rosa was guilty of the theft of Steining's
goods in an amount either less than, equal to, or greater than any
sum of money obtained from Da Rosa .... It is the means em-
ployed which the law denounces, and though the purpose may be
to collect a just indebtedness arising from the created by the
criminal act for which the threat is to prosecute the wrongdoer,
it is nevertheless within the statutory inhibition."
22 Supra, note 2.
23 Supra, note 4.
24 People v. Beggs, supra, note 8.
25 People v. Beggs, ibid.
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Consequently, it might be concluded that a demand for a sum of
money, accompanied by threatened criminal procedure based on the
very act establishing the debt for which satisfaction is demanded, could
possibly fall within the meaning of the offense as outlined in Wis.
STATS. (1951), sec. 340A5.
DEMAND COUPLED WITH A VAGUE THREAT
The question of an express demand accompanied by a rather vague,
questionable threat has not as yet been specifically decided by the Wis-
consin court. The New York courts under "threat" statutes26 similar
to Wisconsin's, 27 have entertained a considerable number of these cases.
In practically all of them the major question involved was whether the
supposed "threat" constituted a threat as contemplated in the statute.
In the case of People v. Thompson,28 Thompson, an attorney, had ap-
peared for the complainant at a preliminary hearing before a magis-
trate. Subsequently thereto, purporting to be an Assistant District At-
torney and writing from the District Attorney's office, he wrote to the
accused's father to the effect that his son was in danger of an indict-
ment, and that he could prevent it and had already done so for the
time being. Stating that it would be desirable if he were to send a gift
to those who had helped him, Thompson wrote: "If you will send me
$75.00 or a note to that amount payable in three months, it would be
very acceptable." Pointing out that this would save considerable ex-
pense as well as prevent scandal, Thompson tried to create the impres-
sion that he was only concerned with the boy's welfare and the family's
reputation. However, the court in sustaining the conviction on the ex-
tortion charge, said:
"The statute cannot be invaded under the guise of friendship.
No precise words are needed to convey a threat. It may be done
by inuendo or suggestion. To ascertain whether a letter con-
veys a threat, all its language together with the circumstances
under which it is written and the relations between the parties
may be considered, and if it can be found that the purpose and
natural effect of the letter is to convey a threat, then the mere
form of words is unimportant."
A similar situation is found in People v. Gillian.9 Gillian, knowing
26 N. Y. REv. STATs. supra, note 13; Supra, note 19.
27 Supra, note 2.
28 People v. Thompson, supra, note 5; cf. People v. Wicks, 98 N.Y. Supp. 163
(1906). An attorney at law (Wicks) employed as counsel in an action for
false arrest, upon a fee contingent upon success-after two trials and one ap-
peal-under an assumed name, upon stationery engraved with and from a
locked post office box hired under an assumed name, in the guise of friendship,
with suggestion of perjury, certainly of ultimate defeat, continued unpleasant
notoriety and increased expense, repeatedly "urges the defendant against whom
he is conducting the litigation to make a settlement-a settlement which will
insure him one-fourth of the amount paid. Wicks was found guilty of extor-
tion.
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that the complainant had had sexual relations with one other than his
wife, and intending to extort money from him, wrote the following
letter:
"I am in a tight place just now for the sume of One Hundred
dollars in cash... Must ask you to loan me that amount until
fall and then I can pay you back with interest... You will not
refuse me this loan. You know you cannot afford to refuse
me... I do not wish to reveal my identity, for reasons, perhaps,
which you can guess . . . P.S. Neither old John or any of the
family knows anything about this. This is the straight goods,
and your money will be returned in the fall, with interest."
When in commenting upon the nature of this letter and upon the threat
implied therein, the New York court concluded as follows:
"The rule undoubtedly is that the threat of the character men-
tioned under the statute must be made in the letter or writing
delivered to the complainant, and if this is not to appear to the
satisfaction of the jury the prosecution must fail. But as we
understand the rule, parol evidence proof may be introduced by
the people for the purpose of showing that by the use of the
language, figures and phrases employed by the writer, he threat-
ened to make the charge as set forth in the indictment, and that
the person to whom it was addressed so understood its mean-
ing ... The gist of the offense is the attempt to extort money by
a malicious threat to accuse of some crime. The words used do
not constitute the offense without the accompanying intent to
extort."
It seems likely to assume that Wisconsin will follow the example of the
New York court in regard to demands accompanied by vague threats
and rule that to ascertain whether a letter conveys a threat, its language,
circumstances and the relations between the parties involved ought to
be considered; that the mere words involved are unimportant if the
intent to threaten is readily perceived.
A THREAT WITHOUT AN ExPREss DEMAND
The court in People v. Wicks,30 while pointing out that the de-
fendant's requests for a settlement of a civil suit then pending was in
effect a demand, made this statement:
"There was no demand in the Wightman case.3 1 ... There was
no demand in the Eichler case.32 There was no demand or any-
thing in the Thompson case 3 3 ... so long as there is an intent by
threat to extort or gain money the mere form of words is of
no consequence."
The question then arises: Is a threat, in and of itself, without an ac-
29 People v. Gillian, 2 N.Y. Supp. 476, 21 N.E. 1117 (1888).
30 People v. Wicks, supra, note 19.
31 People v. Wightman, 104 N.Y. 598, 11 N.E. 135 (1887).
32 People v. Eichler, supra, note 16.
33 People v. Thompson, supra, note 5.
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companying express demand sufficient to meet the requirements of Wis.
STATS. (1951), sec. 340.45? May the demand be inferred and proven
by reference ?
The situation in the Wightman case 34 was briefly as follows: Wight-
man, an attorney, in behalf of May A. Thatcher is purported to have
written to the complainant. After stating that the writer had been in-
formed by May Thatcher that there had been sexual intercourse be-
tween her and the complainant and that she was pregnant by him, pro-
ceeds as follows:
"I suppose you are aware that under these conditions you are
liable for the support of the child and the mother's expenses dur-
ing her sickness. Are you willing to make suitable provisions for
such liability and thereby avoid publicity or will it be necessary
to take legal steps in the matter ?"
The defendant was tried and convicted of the crime of extortion.
In People v. Eichler,3 5 Eichler, an attorney, was convicted of hav-
ing attempted to extort money by threat to accuse the complainant of a
crime. The indictment was based on the following letter:
"Please call at my office at 7 O'Clock this evening in reference
to the Meyer matter, without fail. Otherwise I will be obliged
to proceed against your criminally."
As we previously learned in the Thompson case,36 Thompson, an
attorney, made a rather express demand for a sum of money:
"If you will send me $75.00 or a note of that amount payable in
three months it would be very acceptable."
But can we conclude that a demand has been evidenced in the preceding
cases? A rather express demand may be found in the Eichler case, i.e.
he demanded that the complainant call at his office that evening. The
same, in a sense, is true of the Wightman case. There the demand was
not as express as it might have been, but a demand that he pay for the
child's support and the mother's expenses was nevertheless evidenced.
Thus, demands have actually been found to be present in all three cases.
It is, perhaps, difficult to visualize a case arising in the courts wherein
a demand, express or implied, is not attendant upon the threat involved.
However, were it to pesent itself we might safely presume that the Wis-
consin courts would very likely follow the same procedure as they
would probably follow in considering a vague threat, i.e. parol evidence
would probably be admitted to show that the language employed by the
writer conveyed a demand to the person addressed, and that he had
intended that it should do so.
34 People v. Wightman, supra, note 22.
35 People v. Eichler, supra, note 16.
36 People v. Thompson, supra, note 5.
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EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION
The intent of the legislature in drafting a statute such as Wis.
STATS. (1951), sec. 340.45, in its present as well as its previous forms,
seems clear: The use of threats of criminal prosecution and injury is
not to be permitted. The threat, in and of itself, violates the spirit and
principle of the law. However, the fact that proof of a malicious intent
is required before one may be convicted under the statute would seem
to indicate that the legislature recognizes the possibility that certain
well-meaning individuals, either through their carelessness or for lack
of information, will at one time or another write or verbally make such
demands or threats as to place themselves within the formal require-
ments of the statute. The "intent" element makes the statute effective
in prohibiting the use of threats, but at the same time allows for the
possibility of a lack of good judgment or want of information on the
part of one who otherwise would have been termed an offender.
GERALD A. FLANAGAN
